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Strotz (1956) first suggested that individuals are more impatient when making short-run tradeoffs than long-run ones. Many 
experimental studies supports his conjecture. Motivated by recent evidence from the British Department of Work and Pension 
(2006), this paper applies this behavioral framework to retirement decisions. We propose a three-periods OLG model with 
quasi-hyperbolic consumers whosave for post retirement consumption in the first period and choose their retirement age in 
the second. We show that this behavioral assumption explains the observed drop in post retirement consumptiondue to lack 
of saving and the high level of voluntary (i.e. not due to disability or dismission from the firm) early exit from the labor force. 
When deciding about their retirement age, workers weight too much the costs of remaining at work (i.e. disutility of working, 
implicit tax on continued activity) and too little the benefits of postponed retirement (i.e. increase of the Bismarckian 
component of the pension formula), perceived as too far in the future. We investigate the implications of time inconsistent 
preferences for a political economy model in which voters determine simultaneously thesize and the degree of redistribution 
of the pension system. We show that, when voting over thepayroll tax, time inconsistent young workers, who look for a 
commitment device that increases boththeir saving and retirement age, form a coalition with rich in order to decrease the size 
of the system. When voting over the degree of redistribution, they form a coalition with poor individuals as to in-crease the at 
part of the pension formula. Our political model provides a political justification for the negative relationship between size and 
redistribution observed in most OECD countries (Disney 2004). 
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The future nancial viability of social security systems is a central issue in political debates across the world.
In the last 20 years, most OECD countries have experienced a sharp increase in the population's proportion
of elderly and retired individuals, and a more drastic shift in the same direction will take place in the near
future, if the demographic trends continue. In particular, the increase in the number of retirees is due to
the fact that increases in life expectancy has not been always followed by a corresponding increase of the
minimal retirement age.
Governments have not yet understood the eects of early retirement on social security decits, as most
pension systems continue to have implicit or explicit features that allow workers to quit their workplace
before the minimal age at almost no costs.
Not surprisingly, the combination of insucient reforms and generous early retirement provisions1 has
generated severe pension crisis, especially in European countries. It is not surprising, therefore, that gov-
ernments are trying to deeply reform their pension systems, either by increasing the minimal retirement age
or by tightening the link between pension benets and past earnings. Although necessary, reforming the
pension system is a complicated task. For instance, the two reforms proposed above have a very dierent
political appeal: while the former is heavily opposed by workers and unions and thus appear to be politically
unfeasible, the latter receives more support, since it introduces \incentives" and \disincentives" that are
supposed to induce workers to postpone eciently and autonomously their retirement age, without any
imposition by the government.
Before implementing any reform, we believe that the policymaker should be provided with a complete
theoretical framework that, from one side, illustrates the determinants of early retirement and that, from
the other side, explains how workers would respond to the incentives introduced by an eventual reform.
Concerning the rst aspect, the economic literature (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1996, and Conde Ruiz
and Galasso, 2004) emphasizes the role of rms (the push argument): early retirement concerns primary
low skilled workers, who have been dismissed by their employer either because they are more likely to
receive a negative shock on their productivity level, or because they create a negative externality on young
workers. Moreover, as stressed by Gruber an Wise (2000), the pension system itself induces early retirement,
through an implicit tax on continued activity2. Explanations of early retirement based solely on exogenous
factors are not entirely justied from an empirical point of view (DWP, 2006): according to recent evidence,
retiring earlier than planned appears to be an voluntary choice, and depends on individuals' preferences for
1We dene early retirement as the discrepancy between planned and eective age of retirement (Blondal and Scarpetta,
1998).
2To better understand the concept of implicit tax, consider, for example, a 59 years-old worker: what is the change in
his pension benets if he retires at age 60 instead of age 59? We call accrual rate the dierence between the two pensions.
If this rate is positive, working an additional year increases the total compensation; if the accrual is negative, working more
reduces the pension. Thus a negative accrual rate discourages continuation in the labor force and a positive one encourages
continued labor force participation. We have an implicit tax on continued activity whenever the ratio of the accrual rate to
net wage earnings is negative, otherwise we have an implicit subsidy. Gruber and Wise (2000) show that the accrual rate and
the associated tax are negative at older ages: continuation in the labor force reduces pension benets, providing an incentive
to leave the labor force earlier.
2leisure (the pull argument): ex-ante, individuals overestimate their retirement age but, once they realize
that accumulated savings and pension benets are below their estimated values, regret ex-post about their
lack of commitment.
Based on these observations, this paper presents a dierent view of early retirement, based on the pull
argument, that complements both the push and the implicit tax explanations. More precisely, following
the recent developments of the Economics and Psychology literature, and in order to ll the gap between
the perfect rationality assumed in Public Economics and Political Economy and the bounded rationality
observed in experiments (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), we introduce hyperbolic discounting in individuals'
preferences3.
Hyperbolic individuals, when facing intertemporal trade-os, change their preferences over time, such
that what is preferred at one point in time far in the future is inconsistent with what is preferred today. An
example by Thaler (1981) illustrates this point: if a person has to choose between an apple in 100 days or
two apples in 101 days, he will probably prefer the second option. However, proposing the same trade-o
between today and tomorrow, if the individual has a high preferences for today's utility, his choice may
change and the rst alternative becomes the preferred one. This example shows how certain agents are more
impatient in the short-term than in the long-run. Laboratory and eld studies conrm this intuition and
nd that discount rates are much greater in the short run than in the long run. It follows that present-biased
individuals increase their utility level if a commitment device that force them to stick with the long run
plans would have been made available to them (Laibson, 1997).
Notice that the inability of individuals to respond or to understand correctly intertemporal incentives
introduced by a social security reform can seriously undermine the success of the reform itself, as stressed
by Chan and Stevens (2004). In the paper, making use of repeated observation of individuals' retirement
expectations, they investigate the eects of retirement incentives on those expectations. They show that,
contrary to most of the literature on the topic, that, even if workers consider forward looking incentives
when making their retirement plans, the magnitude of this responsiveness to pension related incentives was
overestimated. Tightening the link between pension and retirement age, therefore, may be an ineective
way to overcome the nancial crisis of the system, if workers are not able to respond eectively to the
incentives introduced by such reform
This paper considers three sources of heterogeneity among agents: the rst two, productivity level and
age, are common features of most political economy model of social security (see Galasso and Profeta,
2002, for a review), whereas the third one, the dierence in the degree of time inconsistency, is the main
peculiarity of this work. In particular, to better match the experimental evidence, we assume that bounded
rationality aects only a fraction of the population, with dierent degrees of awareness.
By introducing quasi-hyperbolic discounting we accomplish three main objectives: rst, we complement
the economic literature on early retirement by showing that the observed early exit from the workforce can
3In the paper, we will refer alternatively to present-biased preferences, time inconsistency and preference reversal. Although
in the literature the meanings of these expressions are slightly dierent, for us all these terms denote a situation where people
are not able to commit to future actions, and have a strict preference for the present.
3be also explained through a model that focus mainly on workers' (bounded) rationality, and not only by
exogenous factors. Because of the lack of commitment, hyperbolic individuals are not able to stick with their
optimal plans, and when deciding whether to retire or not before the mandatory retirement age (beneting
from the early retirement provision), they weigh too much the costs associated to remain at work (foregone
leisure) and less to the benet implied by a longer working career (increase in pension benet, if the the
formula has a component related to past earnings).
Second, the model provides a behavioral justication for the drop in post retirement consumption due
to inadequate saving observed among early retirees (Loewenstein, 1991 and Bernheim, 1995 and Laibson,
1997), within a model that considers explicitly social security and endogenous retirement age.
Third, we analyze the implications of hyperbolic discounting for a voting model in which individuals
vote over the main characteristics of the pension system (its size and its degree of redistribution). To our
knowledge, this is the rst paper that studies the implication of this assumption for a political economy model
with endogenous retirement age. By introducing time inconsistency as an additional source of heterogeneity,
our political model provides a more complet explanation for the paradoxical observation that countries with
low redistribution in social security systems have also larger public pension expenditures compared to
countries with more redistributive pension systems (Disney 2004, Conde Ruiz and Profeta 2005). We show
that the relevant winning coalition determining the size of the pension system is not composed simply by
all poor and all retirees, as shown by traditional political models (see Galasso and Profeta, 2002, for a
review). More precisely, young hyperbolic, also with low productivities, prefer to decrease the payroll tax.
This counterintuitive result comes from the fact that sophisticated hyperbolic workers (who are aware of
their inconsistency issue), looking for a commitment device that would increase both their retirement age
and saving, form a coalition with the rich, who do not support the pension system as they prefer to nance
their post retirement consumption through private savings. When voting over the Bismarckian factor, a
proxy we use for the degree of redistribution of the PAYG system, time inconsistent individuals form a
coaltion with the poor and the old, who are all in favor of a more redistributive system. The intuition goes
as follows: besides the traditional intergenerational and intragenerational forms of redistribution, our model
introduces a third one, namely from time consistent to hyperbolic individuals.
Our paper provide a behavioral justication for the negative relationship between size and redistribution
observed in most OECD pension systems: the more time inconsistency represents an issue4, the smaller
will be the pension system, and the higher will be its degree of redistribution. Finally, we use the results
of both the theoretical and the political model to evaluate the eectiveness of perspective reforms of the
pension system; due to their bounded rationality, individuals are not able to fully understand intertemporal
trade-os, and are not able to correctly respond to incentives. Our model suggests that, in spite of the
popular view, increasing the minimal retirement age would be a more eective way for the government to
overcome the nancial crisis of the pension system.
4We are not saying that certain countries are more time inconsistent than others, but only that the existence of privately-
provided commitment devices diers across countries: if such instruments are not available, hyperbolic individuals look for
other forms of commitment, in the form of a lower payroll tax.
4The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we shortly review of the behavioral literature and its
main results; in section 3, we present the behavioral anomalies in retirement decisions (retirement age and
saving for retirement) that show the empirical relevance of our hyperbolic model and motivate our research.
In section 4, we discuss the relationship between social security and redistribution. In section 5, the basic
features of the model are introduced. In section 6 we analyze the optimal choices of a young worker (saving)
and of an old one (retirement age). In section 7 we derive the solution of an utilitarian social planner. In
section 8, the majority voting equilibrium is determined. Section 9 concludes.
2 Background on Time Inconsistency
The economics and psychology literature (see Laibson, 1997, for a review) has challenged the view that
individuals are perfect far-sighted optimizers. Large body of experimental and eld evidence has demon-
strated that the way individuals take a decision departs substantially form the perfect rationality paradigm.
Examples of such departures are given by anxiety, misperceptions, dynamic inconsistency, mistakes, antici-
patory feelings, reference points and loss aversion. Starting with the seminal works by Laibson (1997), most
of the behavioral literature has focused on a particular form of bounded rationality: time inconsistency (or
quasi-hyperbolic discounting) in intertemporal decisions.
In the hyperbolic model, each individual is represented as a collection of selves: time inconsistency arises
because present selves overweight current payos compared to future ones, giving rise to a conict among
dierent intertemporal selves. Formally, an hyperbolic individual has the following intergenerational utility





where  is the short-term psychological discount factor and  is the time-consistent, long term one. This
formulation implies that the discount factor between now and the next period is , whereas the discount
factor between any two periods in the future is . Equivalently, the discount factor between today and the
next period is declining, and constant thereafter.
Following Gruber and K oszegi (2004), we assume that individuals are heterogenous with respect their
degree of time inconsistency. We model this heterogeneity as follows: each agent is characterized by a
perceived psychological discount factor, which may or may not dier from the true one. The following
denition claries this distinction.
Denition 1 The perceived discount factor is the one individuals have in mind when making decisions.
The real psychological discount factor represents their true degree of time inconsistency. Overcondence is
dened as the dierence between the perceived and the true psychological discount factor. More precisely,
we have:
5Individual Type Perceived DF ^  True DF Overcondence
Exponential 1 1 0
Sophisticated  (< 1)  (< 1) 0
Naive 1  (< 1) 1   
Table II: Perceived and real discount factors.
Exponential, or time consistent, individuals are rational utility maximizers. Sophisticated are aware of
their time inconsistency, as their perceived discount factor coincides with the true one: self t knows that self
t+1 will want to do something other than what self t would have him to do. Therefore, the best thing self
t can do is to nd a commitment device that force him to actually follow his (optimal) plan. Finally, naive
agents are not able to make consistent plans through time (future selves will change systematically those
plans) and are not able to actualize predicted or desired future levels of consumption, since their perceive
themselves as time consistent, but they are actually hyperbolic.
This paper contributes to the recent literature on applied behavioral economics (Della Vigna and Mal-
mendier, 2004, Della Vigna and Paserman 2005). So far, however, only few papers have considered behav-
ioral and psychological issues into more traditional model of public and political economy.
Feldstein (1985), for instance, in a framework with completely myopic individuals who do not save at
all, shows that it may be optimal to have either no social security or one with a very low replacement ratio.
Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (2004) extend Feldstein model, allowing for hyperbolic discounting,
and show that social security is a poor substitute for private saving, even for naive consumers with high
short term discount factor. Diamond and K oszegi (2003), introducing endogenous retirement age in Laibson
(1997) quasi-hyperbolic consumption model, investigate the eects over saving of a social security system,
seen as a commitment device for impatient individuals. Gruber and K oszegi (2004) use the quasi-hyperbolic
setting to derive the optimal tax for addictive goods (cigarettes, fatty foods etc.), and nd that it includes
a \self-control adjustment" component, that provides to sophisticated a commitment device that reduces
consumption of such goods. Cremer et al. (2005) study the optimal design of a linear pension scheme in a
world of wage heterogeneity and complete naivet e for a group of workers who do not save for retirement.
In a companion paper (Cremer et al., 2007), they studies the determination through majority voting of a
pension scheme when there are far-sighted and myopic individuals, who tend to look for instant gratication
when deciding over saving and labor supply. Their model, however, considers only two groups of consumers,
fully myopic who do not save at all and far-sighted, and they do not consider endogenous retirement age,
as we do.
Except for our behavioral assumption, our paper contributes also to the literature on the political
economy of early retirement (Conde-Ruiz and Galasso 2004, Casamatta et al. 1999); our work is also
closely related to Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2005) and Casamatta et al. (2005)5.
5In this paper, individuals, after having chosen retirement age and post-retirement saving, vote over the payroll tax and
the level of the implicit tax on continued activity. They show that a biased pension system may emerge as an equilibrium of
the voting game.
63 Time Inconsistency in Retirement Decisions
In the two following subsections, we present two stylized facts providing evidence on our behavioral as-
sumption. We focus on the discrepancy between planned and real retirement age (subsection 3.1) and the
reduction of post-retirement consumption due to a lack of saving (subsection 3.2).
3.1 The Retirement Age
The objective of this subsection is to illustrate the determinants of the observed high levels of unanticipated
retirement.
The literature generally explains the early exit from the workforce with a redundancy/dismission ar-
gument (Sala-i-Martin 1996, Ahituv and Zeira 2000, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso 2004): older workers are
excluded from the labor force by the rm, either because they have received a negative shock on their
productivity or because they create a negative externality on young's productivity that decreases aggregate
output. We refer to this explanation as the push argument.
We depart from this view by proposing the pull argument: the observed unexpected early exit from labor
force is mainly due to voluntary quits and is a direct consequence of individual, hyperbolic, preferences:
when deciding whether retiring or not, present-biased workers do not evaluate correctly the costs and the
benets associated to their choice and, when young, overestimate their future retirement age.
To give preliminary evidence of our claims, we present a report by the British Department of Work and
Pension6 (2005), in which old workers (starting from the age of 50) are asked to self-report their planned
retirement age. These reports can be seen as the utility-maximizing choices of rational agents who take
into account the costs and the benets associated with the retirement age. Afterwards, expectations are
compared to the true retirement age. Results are reported in Table III.
Age % Planned to retire % Eectively retired % 
<65 25 59 +34
65 45 26 -19
>65 20 9 -11
N/A 10 6 -4
Table III: Planned and eective retirement age7. Source: DWP (2005)
It is immediate to see that the proportion of workers expecting to retire earlier than the mandatory age
is much lower than the proportion of those who actually do. One may argue that the push argument can
explain this discrepancy: workers are forced unexpectedly into early retirement, either because their low
productivity (this could happen in a more or less explicit way, i.e. through bribes, psychological pressure
etc.) or illness or disability. The report contradicts this conclusion: only 15% of early retirees reported to
be made redundant by the rm (explicitly or implicitly); 35% of the sample reported health as the main
6Hereinafter DWP.
7The mandatory retirement age is 65 but people can retire (at reduced benets) starting from 55.
7reason for early retirement, and more than 50% has retired earlier simply because wanted to do, but they
were not able to predict it8. Furthermore, the report shows that neither there is a clear pattern in the
educational or income level of early retirees, nor nancial considerations seem to inuence the retirement
choice (DWP, page 59), in contrast with the idea that early retirees have low level of human capital and
income. According to the DWP, then, early retirement is mainly a voluntary choice, and do not necessarily
concern only poor workers9.
Blondal and Scarpetta (1999) shows that these conclusions can be extended to the majority of European
countries (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Retired males aged 55-64: Main reasons for leaving last job or business. Source: Blondal and
Scarpetta, (1998)
From the table we see that, except for Finland and Sweden, that experienced big labor market shocks
in the 90s, all countries exhibit large share of voluntary early retirees (around 30%).
These stylized facts conrm that individual are not always farsighted optimizers: even if the have strong
preferences for leisure, they should be able to anticipate their retirement age. Therefore, the high level
of early retirees can not be explained only by the usual models of disability and/or low human capital.
Our framework justies the discrepancy between planned and eective retirement age not by a redundancy
argument but by assuming that individuals, although with dierent degrees, display of time inconsistency
 a la Laibson: some workers (exponential) plan to retire at a certain age and eectively do it, some others
know that their retirement age will be lower than the optimal one (sophisticated) and others simply fool
themselves and retire earlier than planned (naive).
3.2 Savings for Retirement
A well known result in intertemporal decision theory is that consumers prefer a smooth or increasing con-
sumption path and save accordingly, even in presence of stochastic income changes (Loewenstein 1991).
8In particular, the main reason for early retirement was the \opportunity of spending more time with a partner or family"
(DWP, page 55), thus conrming that leisure in old age receives great weight in retirees' preferences. Another weakness of
the push argument is that most countries have implemented legislation aimed to reduce age discrimination on the workplace,
making dismissal of old workforce more dicult for the rm. For instance, in 2005, the British Government approved \The
Green Paper" whose objective was to limit age discrimination by employers.
9\The Report shows that, among those who were working, the pull factors were clearly more important than the push factors
in determining the decision to retire early" (DWP, page 56). Another possible explanation is that a change of legislation,
occurred during the period of the survey, has induced workers to unexpected early retirement. Indeed, the \Green Paper",
implemented during the Blair administration, has raised the minimum pension for low income pensioners. However, in spite
the fact that this reform has make early exit more attractive for this group, the data do not show a clear correlation between
income level and voluntary early retirement: the reform had not modify incentives.
8In reality, however, individuals, when young, consume too much and save too little for their post retire-
ment consumption10. Loewenstein (1991) shows that individuals' consumption paths are declining, even
in absence of liquidity constraints, and retirees experience a substantial reduction of their pre-retirement
consumption levels. The sharp drop in the average consumption around the typical retirement age is due
to negative innovations to the income process because workers have overestimated their retirement income
and saving (Bernheim et al., 1998).
Not surprisingly, the drop in post retirement consumption is more severe for early retirees (Haussman and
Paquette, 1987). According to Bernheim (1995) these behaviors can not be explained through the standard
life cycle framework but are more likely justied by psychological issues, and in particular by psychological
impediments to adequate planning for post retirement consumption. This intuition is conrmed by Laibson
and al. (1998): not only individuals save too little, but also regret for this choice: 76% of U.S. workers
near the retirement age believe that they should have saved more. The quasi-hyperbolic model (Laibson et
al. 1998) provides a theoretical justication for these behaviors: simulations in Laibson and Harris (2001)
show that hyperbolic calibrated simulations are able to reproduce the observed high comovement between
consumption and income and the drop in post retirement consumption better than exponential calibrated
simulations.
Individuals' inadequate ability to plan future consumption levels has recently induced nancial inter-
mediaries to promote new instruments aimed to provide time inconsistent individuals with a commitment
device that help them to boost saving (Benjamin, 2003). In the U.S., for instance, these instruments took
the form of tax-deferred savings accounts, such as IRA, 401(k),403(b), 457(b) and 457(f) etc.
Our model assumes that markets are incomplete, in the sense that instruments helping hyperbolic
individuals to save more and retire later are not available. This assumption could appear unrealistic but
can be easily justied: rst, there is no general agreement on the eectiveness of such plans (Bernheim,
1999). Second, assuming the completeness of nancial markets would require to take into account \counter-
commitment devices" that exploit consumers' bias towards the present by reducing the commitment power
of deferred saving accounts. For instance, in the U.S., the introduction of tax deferred saving account was
followed by the boom of revolving credit cards.
4 Social Security and Redistribution
It is well known that a pension system contributes to redistribute income both within and between gener-
ations11. Depending on the link between benets and workers' contributions, PAYG systems are classied
either has Bismarckian, if benets are proportional to contributions paid or Beveridgean, if benets are at.
10The problem is particularly severe in U.K., as stressed by British newspapers: \Not enough of British are saving for
retirement and many of those woh are investing for the future are underestimating the cost of retirement ". (The Guardian,
November 17, 2005). \The gap between what the nation should be saving each year for our retirement and what we are
actually putting away is $27bn" (Association of British Insurers, 2005). \44% of the workforce (12 million workers) did not
have pensions provision beyond those on oer form the state" (Adair Turner, president of Britsh Pensions Commission, 2005).
11A pensions system serves two other fundamental functions: it forces individuals to save for post retirement consumption
and insures workers against disability risks.
9Since contributions paid are proportional to earnings, the former implies, ex-ante, less intergenerational
redistribution than the latter.
Quite counterintuitively, as shown by Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2005), more redistribution does not
necessarily imply that the share of the GDP devoted to the pension system must be higher; in reality,
it exists a negative correlation between the degree of intragenerational redistribution and the size of the
system: Bismarckian systems tend to be bigger than Beveridgean pension schemes, in spite of the fact the
latter is explicitly designed to redistribute income and thus it should receive more support from low income
individuals.
A natural question arises: are Beveridgean systems eectively able to redistribute income from who has
earned more in his working years to those who earned less? If not, in which direction Some papers have
recently tried to answer this question, focusing principally on the (Beveridgean) U.S. system.
Liberman (2001) shows that redistribution seems not to be related to lifetime income but to other
factors: the system redistributes from people with high life expectancies to people with low ones, from
single workers and from couples with high earnings by the secondary earner to one-earner couples and from
workers with an earning history longer than 35 years to workers who works less than 35 years. Moreover,
not only redistribution is not related to income but sometimes the system appears to be regressive: for
instance, 19% of workers in the top lifetime income quantile receive net transfers that are greater than the
average transfer for people in the lowest lifetime income quantile.
Coronado, Fullerton and Glass (2000) show that the claimed progressiveness of the pension system
depends on a series of simplifying assumptions: looking only at redistribution on an annual basis (from
workers to retirees), the system appears to be highly progressive. But, when more realistic assumptions are
considered (dierences in mortality probabilities etc.), the progressiveness of the system decreases and it
may even become negative.
These conclusion seems to be valid not only for the U.S. but also for other social security systems
across the world: some Beveridgean systems have features that reduce the explicit level of redistribution.
The reverse appears also to be true: Disney (2001) show that also some Bismarckian systems redistribute
income from rich to poor, in spite of the fact that they are modeled to guarantee high replacement rates.
Starting from these observations. we can classify OECD social security systems into four groups, on the
basis of type (Bismarckian and Beveridgean), the level of redistribution (high or low), and the generosity,
expressed as a fraction of GDP devoted to pensions. The rst classication (Disney 2001) is made on the
basis of the replacement rates guaranteed by the pension system (higher replacement rates make the system
more Bismarckian), whereas the second is calculated taking into account the progressivity index12 calculated
by OECD (2005). What are the political determinants of cross-country dierences in terms of generosity,
early retirement provision, degree of redistribution, type of the system? Political economy models of social
security tries to answer by referring either to economic or to behavioral explanation. The rst group of
12The index is based on the Gini coecient and it considers only mandatory parts of public pension programs. We con-
sider Beveridgean and Bismarkian pension system with progressivity index above, respectively, 60% and 20%, as \highly
redistributive". See Table V in the Appendix for details.
10paper appeals to the political power of the lower class, that is decisive in the political process and is able to
determine the main characteristics of the system (generosity, early retirement provision etc.). Meltzer and
Richards (1982) and Tabellini (1992) show that the equilibrium size of the pension system is determined by
a coalition of old people and young poor workers.
I - Bismarckian II - Bismarckian
High Redistribution Low Redistribution
High Expenditure High Expenditure
Belgium, Austria Greece
Germany Italy
III - Beveridgean IV - Beveridgean
High Redistribution Low Redistribution
Low Expenditure Low Expenditure
Canada, UK US, The Netherlands
Denmark, New Zealand Japan, Switzerland
Table IV: Classication of pension systems of OECD countries.
Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003, 2004) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) show that an early retirement provision
is introduced in the system by a coalition of old workers with incomplete working history and low-income
young. The rst group, dismissed by their rm because of a negative productivity shock has came, favors
early retirement. The second group agrees to introduce an early retirement clause since they are likely to
become, in the future, early retirees. Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2005) propose a political economy model in
which individuals vote over the size and degree of redistribution of the pension formula. It is shown that a
Beveridgean system is supported by low-income agents, who gain from its redistributive feature, and rich
individuals, who seek to minimize their tax contribution and to invest their resources in a private pension
scheme.
A second group of papers considers behavioral and psychological factors to explains institutional dif-
ferences among pension systems. Benabou and Ok (2001) show that poor may not support high levels of
redistribution today because they hope to be rich in the future. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou
and Tirole (2005) develop models that consider explicitly fairness and equality of opportunities in individ-
uals' preferences: redistribution is low when economic success is perceived as driven by eort and not by
luck. Finally, other papers (see Alesina and La Ferrara 2005 for a review), consider identity: individuals
care about who benet from redistribution (for instance, they do not want to subsidize people from dierent
ethnic groups). Thus, very heterogeneous societies may have lower preferences for redistribution.
This paper merges behavioral and economic explanations by assuming, at the same time, heterogeneity
in productivity levels, age and degree of time inconsistency. Anticipating the results, our model shows that
some agents, independently of their income, prefer to anticipate their retirement and prefer to consume
more when young instead of saving for post-retirement consumption. Furthermore, our political model, in
which the size of the social security system and the degree of redistribution are chose by direct majority
11voting, shows that a winning coalition of hyperbolic individuals is able to determine both the generosity
and the degree of redistribution of the PAYG system. In particular, our model explains why low level
of redistribution are often associated with big pension programs: hyperbolic young workers, looking for
privately-provided commitment devices that increase both saving and retirement age, form a coalition with
the rich in order to decrease the payroll tax. On the other hand, when voting over the degree of the
redistribution of the PAYG system, the winning coalition includes poor and hyperbolic individuals both in
favor of a more redistributive system.
5 Social Security, Retirement and Time Inconsistency: A Model
In this section we present a model of intertemporal consumption with endogenous retirement age (as in
Casamatta et al., 2005 and Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2004), with the assumption of quasi-hyperbolic pref-
erences.
5.1 Basic Setup
Timing The model is set in discrete time. There are three periods and two generations, young and old. At
period 1, an individual is young: he supplies inelastically labor and saves for post-retirement consumption.
At period 2 (pre-retirement), an individual is old: he supplies labor at an eort cost; we interpret labor
supply as the choice of retirement age, as in Casamatta et al. (2005). In period 3 (post-retirement), the
individual is retired and consumes accumulated savings and a pension transfer P13. Moreover, he enjoys
some additional leisure, which is inversely related to the retirement age. The length of period 1 is normalized
to 1, whereas the length of periods 2 and 3 are endogenous, since they both depend on the retirement choice
of the agent. The total length of period 2 and 3 is normalized to 2.
Heterogeneities Besides age, individuals dier for their degree of time inconsistency and their produc-
tivity level. For the former, we refer to Table III and we consider three type of agents: exponential,
sophisticated and naive, who dier on the basis of their perceived short-term discount factor, ^ j. The long
run discount factor, , is assumed to be the same for all individuals.
Concerning the second source of heterogeneity, we assume that:
 A1: Each worker is assigned with a random productivity level !, distributed over the support [! ;!+]
according to a density function f(:) and a c.d.f. F(:). The median productivity, !M; is lower than
the mean,  !.
To simplify, we assume that both the productivity level and the behavioral type remain unchanged across
periods.
13Savings can be interpreted as a voluntary payment to a integrative pension plan, whose benets are paid only when the
beneciary is retired. The fact that P(b zj) is paid only after retirement is indeed a realistic assumption: Sala-i-Martin (1996),
shows that, for 70 out of 108 countries where this information is available, the elderly must show that they do not get labor
income from any other source in order to collect old age pensions.
12We denote with n the exogenous rate of population growth; Nr is the number of old retirees in the
economy, No the number of old workers and Ny = (1 + n)(No + Nr) the number of young. The total
population is therefore N = Ny + No + Nr or, equivalently, (No + Nr)(2 + n): Each behavioral type
represent a fraction of the whole population, such that Ni = Ni;e + Ni;n + Ni;s, with i = y;o; where the
subscripts e, n and s stand for exponential, naive and sophisticated individuals14. None of them represent
1=2 of the population.
Utility The multi-selves formulation of (1) implies that each individual of type j = e;n;s maximizes the








y) + ^ ju(cj
o) (2)
where u(:) is the instantaneous utility function, assumed to be the same for all individuals, increasing and
concave, and satisfying Inada conditions.
We denote with, respectively cy and co consumption levels when young and old (with include both period
two and three).
As in Casamatta et al. (2005), the variable z 2 [0;1] denotes the fraction of the second period an old
agent spent working. It follows that the lengths of periods two and three are, respectively, z and (2   z).
Consumption when old is net of the disutility of working, m(z) and the utility from leisure when retired,
l(z), both expressed in unit of consumption.
We assume specic form for functions m(z) and l(z):
 A2: m(z) =
z
2
2 , where  measures the intensity of the disutility of eort.
 A3: l(z) =
 (1 z)
2
2 , where   represents the intensity of the utility from leisure. We assume that
 > !+ > !  >  .
Each worker (young and old) pays a proportional payroll tax  2 [0;1] on his wage that nances the PAYG
system. Therefore, consumption levels for young and old of type (!, j) are given by:
cj
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where b sj  0 and P(b zj) represent saving and pension benets, both depending on perceived retirement age,
b zj. The \hat" stresses the fact that, due to our behavioral assumption, consumption levels, retirement age
and saving depend all on the perceive discount factor ^ j.
Finally, r is the exogenous interest rate paid on accumulated saving; to simplify notation, we impose
1=(1 + r) = .
14Notice that we the distribution of behavioral types among old retirees does not matter for our purposes, since all economic
decisions are already taken.
13From the intertemporal utility function (2) and the old budget constraint (3), it is easy to see that
individuals are not only time inconsistent between generations (equation 2) but also within generations
(equation 3). It follows that, from the point of view of an hyperbolic young who is evaluating the trade-o
between working and retiring when old, the discount factor is , whereas for an old is ^ j. This discrepancy
captures the peculiarity of time inconsistency: when deciding over the retirement age, hyperbolic agents
change their preferences, giving too much weight to the present costs of staying at work (the disutility of
eort), and less to the future benets (increase of pension benets). Moreover, this discrepancy aects also
savings: hyperbolic young, when choosing whether to consume or not, discount the post-retirement period
only by ^ j2.
The Pension System The PAYG system is assumed to be balanced every period, so the sum of all
awarded pensions is equal to the sum of all contributions paid. The pension received by an individual of
type (!;j) is given by:
P(z) = !(1 + n + z)
| {z }
I




To introduce distributional concerns in our model, we assume that (4) includes two components15: a
Bismarckian (I, related to contributions paid by the worker and its retirement age) and a Beveridgean
one (II, at, related to the mean wage of the economy,  !); both components have a rate of return equal
to rate of population growth, n. The parameter  2 [0;1] represents the implicit tax on continued activity
(Gruber an Wise, 2000), and takes into account that the pension system itself induces workers to leave
earlier their job: for  = 0, the pension system is neutral, i.e. the marginal benet of working one more
year is !. For  > 0, individuals have incentive to retire earlier16, since the marginal benet of working
more is reduced to !(1   ).
The weight  2 [0;1] in (4) is the Bismarckian factor (Conde Ruiz and Profeta, 2005). If  = 1, the
system is purely Bismarckian, and benets are proportional to the contributions paid. For  = 0, the
system is purely Beveridgean: benets are at and not related to the worker's wage history. If  < 1, the
pension has two tiers: a at one, which provides a minimum amount of income, and a second one that
relates pension benets to the history of previous wage earnings.
For the rest of the paper, we make two technical assumptions about ; these assumptions will guarantee








15The dependence of P(z) on ! is justied by Sala-i-Martin (1999): in most countries, benets are typically an increasing
function of the workers' previous wage history.
16Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004) show that such distortions are optimal in a second-best setting with a government
concerned by redistributive issues and asymmetric information on individuals' productivity and health status.
14The rst inequality implies that  is not too high17. The second inequality, i.e.   1
1+n is reasonable,
given the low rate of population growth (n  0) observed in most industrialized countries.
The Political Process The voting process works as follows: elections take place every period. Young and
old (at the beginning of period 2) vote simultaneously over the payroll tax  and the Bismarckian factor,
18. The impact of time inconsistency on voting behavior is twofold: from one hand, hyperbolic young
vote having in mind their perceived discount factor, ^ j, since do not fully internalize how their present vote
aects future utility. On the other hand, old (naive) realize ex-post their true  and their ovecondence,
which has lead to save and retire suboptimally and vote according to their true j, after having chosen sj
and zj on the basis of the perceived discount factor. Formally, we have:
 A5: Old's indirect utility function V o(o
j ;;j;!) and voting behavior depend on j: Young's indirect
utility function V y(
y
j ;; ^ j;!) and voting behavior depend on ^ j.
This assumption implies also that, when young, naive voters like exponential, whereas, when old, like
sophisticated. It follows that the total number of time consistent young voters is Ny;TC = Ny;e + Ny;n,
whereas for old is: No;TC = No;e.
Figure 2 summarizes the basic features of our model.
6 The Optimization Problems
In this section we characterize optimal choices for young (saving) and old (retirement age).
6.1 Retirement Age
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0  b zj  1
Notice that an old worker discounts post retirement consumption by ^ j. The rst order condition associated
with problem (5) is:
!(1   )    b zj + ^ j [!   (1   b zj) ] = 0
17According to Gruber and Wise (1997), in a sample of 11 developed countries, the value of  is approximately around 50%,
making  2 [1=2;1]:
18We assume, without loss of generality, that old retirees do not vote. The reason for our assumption is the following:
retirees' objective is to increase their consumption as much as possible: thus, all retirees will vote for the maximum payroll
tax,  = 1. Moreover, when voting over , all agents with ! <  ! prefer a completely at pension,  = 0, whereas all individuals
with ! >  ! vote for  = 1. Since we assume that the income distribution is skewed to the left, the second group will always
represent a minority. Therefore, considering that also retirees vote would change only the level of equilibrium functions mv
and mv, but not their shape.
15Figure 2: Timing of the Model
After some rearrangements, optimal retirement age is given by:
b zj =
!(1   ) + ^ j(!    )
   ^ j 
8j = e;s;n (6)
The solution is interior , !+
h
1   (1   ^ j)
i
 , as implied by A3. All individuals choose to work
in the second period, except if  = 1 and ! =  . The intuition is the following: nobody work when
the system is completely non neutral and when the increase in the Bismarckian part of the pension due to
an additional year spent working (!) is exactly equal to the marginal benet of quitting the job at the
beginning of the old age ( ).
Comparative statics on (6) leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Optimal perceived retirement age, b zj is:
(i) increasing in !; and  ;
(ii) decreasing in payroll tax, , and increasing in the Bismarckian factor, ;
(iii) increasing in ^ j.
Result (i) is in line with the literature (Casamatta et al. 2005 and Conde-Ruiz and Galasso 2004): rich
workers, having a lower price of consumption/leisure in period 2 than poor, retire later. In part (ii) we




!(1   ^ j)
   ^ j 
< 0 (7)
and this eect is more marked for high productivity workers, since
@2 b zj
@! < 0.





   ^ j 
> 0
Notice that this eect is more marked for individuals with high ^ j: intuitively, individuals who perceive
themselves as time consistent think they can work more if the pension is more earning-related.
More interesting is result (iii): @ b zj=@^ j > 0 implies that the higher is the worker's perceived degree
of time inconsistency, the later he believes he will retire. This conclusion is in line with the stylized facts
presented before: some workers anticipates correctly their retirement age, whereas others overestimate it.
Depending on the behavioral type, three cases are possible.
Exponential These individuals have ^ e =  = 1. Replacing the true discount factor in (6), an exponential
worker (b ze) will retire at:
b ze =
!(1   ) + (!    )
    
(8)
which also coincides with the actual one, b ze = ze. In the following, we refer to ze as the normative retirement
age, dened as the retirement age to which a young individual would commit himself.19.
Sophisticated They are aware of their time inconsistency: their perceived discount factor is equal to the
real one: ^ s =  < 1; planned b zs and actual retirement age, zs, coincide:
zs  b zs =
!(1   ) + (!    )
    
(9)
For these agents, however, the lack of commitment leads to a welfare loss; they would be better, in a
Pareto sense, if their retirement age would be the one preferred by exponential, as shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 For sophisticated workers, the normative retirement age, ze, is greater than the equilibrium
retirement age zs. If  is not too small, switching from zs to ze will create a Pareto-improvement.
Proof. All Proofs are in Appendix B.
Naive Their true discount factor, (< 1), is lower than the perceived one, ^ n(= 1). Their planned
retirement age c zn, is:
c zn =
!(1   ) + (!    )
    
(10)
but the true one is:
zn =
!(1   ) + (!    )
    
(11)
19Rigorously, we should dene normative retirement age as the zj to which self 0 and all future selves would commit.
However, there is no loss in generality to use this denition of normative retirement age (see Laibson 1998).
17Thus, naive agents exhibit overcondence, which is given by:
z  c zn   zn =
(1   )[ !(1   ) + (!    )]
(    )(    )
> 0 (12)
Notice that the overcondence eect justify why we some individuals systematically overestimate their
retirement age: they believe will retire at c zn, but their bias will lead them to retire at zn. Moreover, it is
easy to see that @z=@ < 0: more time consistent individuals display less overcondence; in the limiting
case, z = 0 if  = 1.
6.2 Savings
Young of type (!;j) decide how much to save for post retirement consumption anticipating that retirement
age will be (6). The maximization program is the following:
max
b sj
u(!(1   )   b sj) + ^ ju
h
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0  b sj  !(1   )









(1 + r) = 0 (14)










It follows that, 8j, cj
y > cj
o, since ^ j < 1 and the concavity of the utility function: hyperbolic discounting
leads to overconsumption in the young age. Individuals are not able to smooth consumption over time and
the lower is the true , the more relevant is this eect20. In the following, we will refer to se as normative
saving, i.e. saving chosen by an exponential individual. The following proposition shows that sophisticated
would increase their welfare if a commitment device that helps them to save se is made available.
Proposition 2 For sophisticated, the normative saving se are greater than equilibrium saving ss: If s is
not too small, switching from ss to se will induce a Pareto-improvement.
Proof. See Appendix B.
7 The Planner's Problem
Although the aim of this work is mainly positive, it is worth to establish as a benchmark the solution
an utilitarian social planner would choose. We restrict policies in the same way as in the voting process
20This Euler equation reduces to the one in Casamatta et al. (2005) for exponential and naive (^ e = ^ n = 1), and to the
Hyperbolic Euler Equation of Laibson and Harris (2001) for sophisticated (^ s = ).
18considered in the next section: instruments are limited to  and . In our framework the planner's problem
is not standard: in general, according to Kahneman (1994), each individual maximizes his \decision utility",
i.e. the utility function that reects his choices, whereas the government maximizes the agent's \experience
utility", the utility function that reects his welfare; usually, the two concepts naturally coincides, but here
they dier, since the planner and the individual do not agree on the weight attributed to future utilities:
we have seen that naive individuals are biased toward the present when deciding their saving and their
retirement age.
7.1 First Best
In a rst best setting, where every source of heterogeneity is observable by the the government, even


























(1 + n + z(!))

f(!)d! = 0 (16)
where x(!) = !z(!)(1   ) + ^ j (P(z(!)) + (1 + r)b sj) is consumption when old. Notice that we are
considering the true retirement age, z(!) since, in a rst best setting, we suppose that the government is
able to force individuals to retire at the optimal age. From the rst order conditions, we have:
u0(cy(!)) = (1 + n)u0(co(!)) = 
z(w) =
!    
    
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint. The rst FOC implies that con-
sumption is equated across individuals and across time, if (1 + n) = 1: The second condition tells us that
optimal labor supply in second period is such that the net marginal disutility of working an additional year,
(    )z(w); equates the marginal benet of continued activity, !, net of the forgone leisure   enjoyed
if the worker would have retired. This rst best can be decentralized through a system of lump sum taxes
and transfers: however, given the scal instruments we are restricting to, this solution can not be achieved.
7.2 Second Best
In a second best setting, time inconsistency is not observable, but the planner knows the distribution of
naive and sophisticated among the population21. The planner's objective is to set  and  as to minimize
the welfare loss resulting from overcondence. More precisely, we follow the approach developed by Rabin
21Notice that we are implicitely assuming that the planner can not, in the second best, force individuals to retire at the
optimum retirement age.
19Figure 3: The perceived (left) and the true (right) pension function
and O'Donoughe (2001, 2007) and Gruber and K oszegi (2004): the social welfare function is time consistent
(j = 1), but the budget constraint take into consideration that hyperbolic individuals retire according to
their true discount factor.
7.2.1 The Government's Budget Constraint
Let us dene the perceived pension, P(b zj), as the benets each type think to receive after retirement, which
diers from the true one, P(zj). The perceived function is also the pension young individuals of type
j = e;s;n have in mind when they cast their vote over  and . Replacing (6) into (4), we get:
P(b zj) =
 
1 + n +
!(1   ) + ^ j(!    )
   ^ j 
!
! + (1 + n)(1   ) ! (17)
Whereas for sophisticated and naive we have P(b zs) = P(zs) and P(b ze) = P(ze), for naive P(c zn) > P(zn).
The dierence between the two pensions, P, reects the overcondence eect that naive experience:
P  P(c zn)   P(zn) =
(1   )(!(1   )  + (!    )
(    )(    )
> 0
The next Lemma establishes an important property of the perceived pension function.
Lemma 2 The pension function is concave in ; with a maximum in ^  =
!
2+(1+n)( ^ j )(!+(1 ) !)
22!2(1 ^ j) :
Proof. See Appendix B.
Increasing  has two eects on the pension function: (i) for given zj(^ j), it increases the future pension;
(ii) it reduces the worker's retirement age. The lemma shows that, for   ^ , the rst eect prevails. Because
of the overcondence eect, P(b zj) diers from the pension scheme that satises the government's budget
constraint: the discrepancy between the two is due to the negative externality exerted by naive individuals
20on exponential and sophisticated. The former do not internalize that retiring earlier than planned leads to




















Taking into account that naive and sophisticated retire according to (9) and (11)), the average pension for
each group of retirees is:
 Pj(;) = (1 + n) ! +

   j 

(1   )E(!2) + j(E(!2)    )

for j = n;s
 Pe(;) = (1 + n) ! +

    







!2dF(!) and j = f;1g: In the rst period, the tax base is xed, (1+n) !, and depends
on the true retirement age in the second period. Dierentiating twice (19), we get:
 P0() = (1 + n) ! +
(   22)E(!2) + 2j2(E(!2)    )
   j 
> 0
 P00() =  
22E(!2)(1   j)   j2 
   j 
< 0
The budget curve, represented in the Figure 3, is concave, always above the line (1 + n) ! and equal to it




7.2.2 Second Best Levels of  and 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Following Casamatta et al. (2005), the rst FOC has a straightforward interpretation: if there are not
liquidity constraints, standard results in linear income taxation apply: it is optimal to set opt = 1 in the
rst period, since young's labor supply is inelastic, and to redistribute through lump-sum transfers in the
second period, setting, for example, opt = 0, i.e. the pension includes only a Beveridgean component.
However, with liquidity constraints, it is no longer true that it is optimal to impose a 100% income tax in
the rst period: consumption in young age must be positive. Therefore, optimality requires opt < 1:
Replacing the expressions for
@  Pj




















(  )(  ) is a constant term and Ny;TI = Ny;n + Ny;s is the number of time
inconsistent individuals. Expression (22) implies that the planner uses that the Bismarckian parameter
 as a commitment device the helps time inconsistent workers to increase their welfare. To understand
why, rst notice that opt is an increasing function of Ny;TI: the higher is the number of time inconsistent
individuals, the higher is the Bismarckian component of the pension formula. The intuition for this result
is simple: from Lemma 1, we know that naive's retirement age is increasing in . Since in the second best
setting the planner can not force individuals to retire at the optimal zj, establishing a tighter link between
working career through a higher opt is a way to induce workers not to quit earlier their job and total
welfare (Proposition 1)22. Moreover, the term M is increasing in overcondence ((1   )): the more naive
overestimate their retirement age, Z, and pension benets, P, the tighter the link between pension and
retirement age should be.
8 The Political Equilibrium
In this section we consider a voting model in which all individuals vote simultaneously over the payroll tax
 2 [0;1], and the Bismarckian factor,  2 [0;1]. The political game works as follows: elections take place
every period. Since each individual has zero mass, everyone vote sincerely. Because of the bidimensionality
of the voting space, a Condorcet winner may not exist. We handle this problem by using the notion of
structure induced equilibrium dened by Shepsle (1979), which ensures the existence of an equilibrium if




, the second term at the numerator and the second one at the
denominator would disappear, and (22) would be lower.
22the multidimensional voting game is transformed into an issue-by-issue voting game. We rst determine
the majority voting equilibrium payroll tax, for a given level of redistribution: mv(). Then, for every
value of the tax rate, we compute the majority voting Bismarckian factor, for given payroll tax, mv().
The (structure induced) equilibrium of our game (s;s), if any, is the point at which these two functions
intersect.
8.1 Voting over 










where  is considered as given. Let us dene, respectively, the indirect utility functions for young of type
(^ j,!) and old of type (j;!), as follows:
V y(
y
j ;; ^ j;!) = u(!(1   
y
j )   b sj)+ (23)
+ ^ ju
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Since the tax rate chosen by majority voting not only inuences the size of the PAYG system, but also
individuals' decision about retirement age: it is possible that, for some values of 
y
j , an individual prefers
the pension system to private saving and for some others not. To take into account this possibility, the
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b sj = cy   !(1   
y
j )  0
The solution to the above problem give us young's most preferred tax rate, +
y (!;; ^ j). In the appendix
we show that results depend on the value of : The following two propositions summarize our ndings.
We rst consider the case  < 1=2.
Proposition 3 Suppose  > 1=2: Then:
(i) Preferred tax rates +
y (!;; ^ j) are positive for individuals with income !   ! < ~ ! and decreasing with
!;
23Figure 4: Preferred  for time consistent and hyperbolic young: cases  < 1=2 (left) and  > 1=2 (right).
(ii) There exists a threshold !0(< ~ !) such that saving are zero for individuals with !  !0; and positive and
increasing with income thereafter;
(iii) For individuals with +




@ ^ j < 0 for !  




@ ^ j  0 for !b  ! < ~ !;
(iv) The threshold ~ ! is strictly decreasing in the degree of perceived time inconsistency ^ j: ~ !TI > ~ !TC;
(v) No young individual chooses a corner solution at +
y (!;; ^ j) = 1;








@ < 0 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix B.








y (!;; ^ j = ) preferred taxes for sophisticated.
In part (i) we show that, for given ^ , only individuals with productivity levels up to ~ ! support the
social security system. Rich individuals, on the other hand, nance period three consumption through
private saving, and vote for  = 0. Moreover, +
y (!;; ^ j) is decreasing with productivity, a result in line
with the literature. Several forces contribute to this result: rst, notice that current consumption, cj
y, is
increasing with !. Also consumption when old, cj
o, is increasing with income, provided that it is a normal
good. Consequently, rich individuals would like to transfer more resource in the second period through a
higher  (income eect). Second, a substitution eect operates: if ! rises, the relative price of rst and
second period consumption decreases, and this eect is more marked for low income workers. For utility
24functions such that the coecient of relative risk aversion23, , is lower than 1, as we assume, the substitution
eect dominates the income eect: low productivity individuals prefer larger  than high productivity ones.
Finally, assuming endogenous retirement age leads to a third eect (Casamatta et al., 2005): second period
consumption increases with productivity, given that more productive individuals retire later (Lemma 1),
and young rich raise their rst period consumption by reducing the payroll tax.
Result (ii) is in line with Casamatta et al. (1999): it exists a threshold !0 such that individuals with
productivity below !0 do not save and rely only on the pension system to nance third period consumption.
On the other and, for productivities above !0, saving are positive and increasing with !. Combining this
result with (i), we see that, for !0  !  ~ !, we have interior solutions for both  and b sj. Furthermore,
since saving are increasing with income and preferred tax rate are decreasing with it, we see that workers
progressively replace the pension system with private savings, up to the threshold ~ !, where preferred  is
zero.
Parts (iii) and (iv) are a novelty of this work and follow from our behavioral assumption. In (iii) we
compare, for given !, sophisticated preferred tax rates, 
y
TI, with those of exponential and naive, 
y
TC. We









TI thereafter. The intuition for the rst part of the proposition is simple:
notice that, for !  !b, saving are zero and zs < ze, for a given !. Sophisticated nd optimal to set  higher
than exponential: a higher tax entails only a second-order loss, since it further reduces retirement age, but
has a rst-order gain, as it increases the size of pension system. Since the former eect is less marked for










prefer a smaller payroll tax than exponential with the same !. The intuition for this result comes from
the \commitment device" argument, typical in the Economics and Psychology literature (see Gruber and
K oszegi, 2004). In absence of a publicly-provided commitment instrument that would help hyperbolic
discounters to overcome their self-control issues, sophisticated look for a \personal" commitment device
that increases at the same time zs and ss, whose values are suboptimal. In Lemma 1 and Appendix B, we
have shown that both retirement age and saving are decreasing with . Moreover, from Propositions 1 and
2, we know that increasing zs and ss towards ze and se (normative retirement age and saving), increases
sophisticated welfare as well. Therefore, the commitment device for hyperbolic individuals takes the form
of a lower payroll tax.
In (iv), we demonstrate that ~ !, the income threshold such that private savings are preferred to the
pension system, is greater for sophisticated than for exponential and naive: e !TI > e !TC. This is intuitive:
whereas time consistent workers with !  e !TC nd unattractive the pension sytem, as they can transfer
autonomously income in the second and third periods, sophisticated with productivity levels ! 2 [e !TC; e !TI],
still nd attractive it.
23The coecient of relative risk aversion, for a generic increasing and concave utility function u(x), is dened as  
 xu00(x)
u0(x) .
Assuming   1 is standard in the literature (see Cremer et al. 2004).
25Part (v) is straightforward: with +
y (!;; ^ j) = 1, marginal utility of consumption in the rst period
tends to innite, and thus young prefers tax smaller than 1.
In (vi), we show that most preferred tax rates are concave in . The intuition for this result is the
following: an increase of  has benecial eects for rich individuals (those with with !  b !), since it
increases b zj, P(b zj) and cj
o and tights the link between pension and working career. Moreover, the benets
of a higher  are amplied if the size of the PAYG is further increased, given that the costs of a high 
(reduced retirement age) have only a second-order eect on rich total utility. Therefore, preferred  must
increase with . For poor individuals, +
y (!;; ^ j) is decreasing with : when  > 1=2, and redistribution
is low, a greater  further reduces it. Poor individuals have to rise their z to have more resources in period
three: this can be done only if the payroll tax is set to a lower level. It follows that  must be decreasing
with , in order to increase both labor supply and P(^ zj). On top of that, by continuity of the preferred tax











y (!;; ^ j) is increasing in  for   ^  and decreasing otherwise.
We move now to the second case,  < 1=2; which implies that the redistributive part in the pension
formula is high.
Proposition 4 Suppose  < 1=2. Then:
(i) Preferred tax rates +
y (!;; ^ j) are positive and increasing with productivity for individuals with ~ ! <
!  !+;
(ii) The threshold ~ ! is strictly increasing in the degree of perceived time inconsistency ^ j;
(iii)For individuals with +





@ ^ j < 0.
(iv) No young individual chooses a corner solution at +
y (!;; ^ j) = 1.





Proof. See Appendix B.
In part (i) we show that only rich individuals prefer a positive tax rate: by increasing , they can transfer
more resources from rst to second period, provided that consumption is a normal good. Poor workers,
on the other side, will retire earlier and prefer to keep the tax rate as low as possible, in order to increase
retirement age and saving.
Part (ii) says that the higher is the perceived time consistency of the worker, the less support the social
security system receives: for sophisticated, the eect described in part (i) emerges for lower productivity
levels, because these agents realize they are not able to respect their plans.
In part (iii), we show that time-inconsistent agents prefer a higher tax rate than exponential, for a given
productivity level. The intuition goes as follows: given that  is low, rich workers increase P(^ zj) through
a higher tax rate, and this eect is more marked for hyperbolic individuals. The commitment eect of
26Figure 5: Preferred  for time consistent and hyperbolic old.
proposition 3 does not operate here: those in favor of a positive  have already positive saving and high
retirement age. The increase of utility to a lower  (which increases z and s) has a second order eect than
the increase in utility due to a more generous pension, given that @z=@ is decreasing with income. Time
consistent individuals, on the other hand, are less interested in transferring resources through the PAYG
system, given their optimal choices, thus preferring a lower, although positive, .




@ > 0 is relevant.
8.1.2 The Old
Maximization of (24) leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Preferred tax rates for old have the following properties:
(i) Preferred tax rates +
o (!;;j) are positive for individuals with productivity !   !  _ ! and always
lower than 1.
(ii) Preferred tax rates +
o (!;;j) are increasing for productivity levels !   ! <  ! and decreasing in !
for  !  !  _ !;
(iii) The threshold _ ! is strictly decreasing in j;
(iv) Preferred tax rates +
o (!;;j) are increasing with j for income levels !c < ! < !d and decreasing
with j, 8! such that !   !  !c and !d  !  _ !;










Proof. See Appendix B.
27We provide now a sketch of the main intuitions, with the help of Figure 5, where o
TC  +
o (!;; = 1)
denotes preferred tax rates of time consistent old and o
TI  +
o (!;;) those of naive and sophisticated.
In part (i) we demostrate that only agents with productivity levels below _ ! support the social security
system; this result contrasts with the literature on positive social security (Casamatta et al. 1999), in which
every old votes for a positive  and at least a fraction for  = 1. This result follows from the fact that
labor supply at period two is elastic and from the concavity of the perceived pension function; to see why,
notice that increasing  has two opposite eects on individuals' utility: from one side, it reduces retirement
age (Lemma 1) but, from the other, it increases pension benets, provided that the tax rate is below the
threshold ^  (Lemma 2). For individuals with productivity up to _ !, the second eect overweights the rst
one: preferred tax rates are positive.
In (ii) we show that, for a given , +
o (!;;j) is a concave function with a maximum at  !. This eect is
due to the two eects pointed out in part (i) and a third eect: in Lemma 1, we show that
@^ zj
@ is increasing
with !, i.e. poor reduces more than rich z in response to an increase in the payroll tax. It follows that, for
low productivity levels, the rst eect prevail over the other two, and tax rates are increasing with income,
up to  !. For income levels ! 2 [ !; _ !] however, the third eect prevails, and the reduction of z is less than
compensated by the increase in P:  decreases with income. Moreover, we have shown that individuals
with high productivity levels start to replace the PAYG system with private saving. This continues up to
_ !, where an individual exclusively relies on accumulated saving and vote for +
o = 0.
In (iii) we claim that exponential old are less likely to support the pension system. The threshold such
that private saving are preferred to the social security system is lower for time consistent old: _ !TI > _ !TC.
Rich exponential have optimal private saving and a longer career, and a generous pension system is not
necessary. On the other hand, naive and sophisticated, who have realized the suboptimality of their choices,
support social security for higher productivity levels than exponential, as the want to raise post-retirement
consumption levels.
In (iv) we show that, for given !, preferred tax rates are non-monotonic in j; more precisely, for
productivity levels below !c and above !d; time inconsistent individuals prefer higher  than exponential.
Both hyperbolic poor (those with !   !  !c) and hyperbolic rich (those with !d  !  _ !) prefer a more
generous system in order to increase post retirement consumption, but the reasons behind such behavior
dier: since  is given, the former group would like to augment the size of Beveridgean component of P(zj),
whereas the latter the size of the Bismarckian part. Hyperbolic agents, i.e. those with !c < ! < !d,
on the other hand, prefer a lower  than exponential. The intuition goes as follows: for given , these
individuals are less interested in increasing the size of the Beveridgean part, since their productivity level
is around the average; moreover, their lack of self control makes the Bismarckian part less attractive. It
follows that a commitment device strategy operates here: lowering  increases consumption for second and
third periods, increases z, but at a cost, since it reduces the pension benets. However, since period three
utility is discounted at the hyperbolic factor , this loss has only a second order eect in total utility.
Intuition for (v) goes exactly as for Proposition 3, and thus is omitted.
288.2 Equilibrium Tax Rate
In the appendix we prove that preferences over  are single-peaked, both for young and old voters, and the
median voter theorem applies. In the following, to highlight our contribution with respect to traditional
political economy model of social security, we compare the equilibrium tax rate of our hyperbolic voting
game, mv
TI (), to the tax rate that would emerge in a model with exponential discounting, mv
TC().
Since preferred tax rates depends crucially on the value of the parameter , we will consider separately
the two cases.
Case  > 1=2
Figure 6 and Proposition 6 illustrate the Condorcet winner of the voting game24.
Figure 6: Equilibrium  when  > 1=2 and o
TC( !)  
y
TI(! ).
Proposition 6 If   1=2 and o
TC( !)  
y
TI(! ); the majority voting equilibrium tax rate mv() satises
the following conditions:
(i) If (1 + n)Ns R !+
~ !TI f(!)d! + (Ns + Nn)
R !+
_ !TI f(!)d! > N(2 + n)=2, then mv
TI () = 0.
24In the appendix we show that o
TC( !), the maximal preferred tax rate for time consistent old, and 
y
TI(! ), the maximal
preferred tax rate for hyperbolic young are not comparable: both cases are possible. However, the case o
TC( !) < 
y
TI(! )
gives the same results of the case o
TC( !)  
y
TI(! ). Therefore, without loss of generality, we can focus only on the second
one.
29(ii) The majority voting equilibrium mv



















































TI () = +
o (!1;;j) = +
o (!2;;j) = +
o (!3;;j) = +
o (!4;;j) = +
y (!5;; ^ j) = +
y (!6;; ^ j)
(iv) mv
TI () < mv













We give a sketch the proof, which relies on standard arguments, through Figure 6, where we have
supposed that the median income is such that the equilibrium payroll tax is mv
TI ().
In (i), we show that social security can not be sustained as an equilibrium, if the number of voters in
favor of a rate does not represent at least half of the population.
Part (ii) follows directly from Propositions 3 (iii) and 5 (iii). We show that, for a given !, time
inconsistent agents are more favorable to support a pension system than exponential: thresholds e ! and _ !
(productivities level such that preferred  are positive) are both decreasing with ^ j
25. It follows that, if the
fraction of hyperbolic in the population with productivity ! 2 [_ !TC; _ !TI] and ! 2 [~ !TC; ~ !TI], the pension
system is more likely to be supported as an equilibrium. The extra-support for social security due to time
inconsistency is given by the term (No;s + No;n)
R _ !TI
_ !TC f(!)d! + (1 + n)No;s R ~ !TI
~ !TC f(!)d!.
In part (iii) we state that the majority voting equilibrium tax rate mv
TI () is determined by two opposite
forces. The rst one, the overcondence eect, increases mv
TI (): old naive have realized the suboptimal-
ity of their choices, and favor a more generous system in order to compensate the drop in post retirement
consumption. The second one, the commitment eect, goes in the opposite direction: for a given produc-
tivity level, a sophisticated young favor a lower  than a young exponential. As stressed above, sophisticated
young, aware of their present bias, see a lower payroll tax as a commitment device that increases both zs
and ss and mitigate the negative eects of time inconsistency.
25Most preferred tax rates for exponential old with productivity 2 [ _ !TC; _ !TI] and for exponential and naive young with
! 2 [~ !TC; ~ !TI are zero, whereas for sophisticated young and naive old, these tax rates are positive.
30In part (iv), we compare the hyperbolic equilibrium tax rate, mv
TI (), to the one that would emerge
in a standard exponential model, mv
TC(). We show that, if the coalition made of hyperbolic young and
rich individuals outnumbers that made of poor old and time consistent young, i.e. the commitment eect
is higher than overcondence, we have in the hyperbolic equilibrium a smaller pension system that of the
exponential model: mv
TI () < mv
TC().
Case  < 1=2
When the Bismarckian part of the pension system is below 1=2, the characterization of the equilibrium
is slightly modied. Proposition 7 summarizes our ndings.
Proposition 7 If  < 1=2; the majority voting equilibrium tax rate satises the following conditions:
(i) If (1+ n)Ns R ~ !TI
! f(!)d! +(Ns +Nn)
R !+
_ !TI f(!)d! > N(2+ n)=2, then the majority voting equilibrium
tax rate mv
TI () is 0.
(ii) The majority voting equilibrium mv



















(iii) The majority voting equilibrium tax rate is the rate preferred by the workers with earnings !1;!2;!3;!4; !5






























TI () = +
o (!1;;j) = +
o (!2;;j) = +
o (!3;;j) = +
o (!4;;j) = +
y (!5;; ^ j) = +
y (!6;; ^ j)
(iv) If Ny;TI 6= 0 (or No;TI 6= 0), mv
TI () > mv
TC().
Parts (i) and (ii) parallel Proposition 6. The only dierence is given by (iii), in which we determine
the equilibrium tax rate, mv
TI (). Contrary to the previous case, here both the overcondence and the
commitment eect go in the same direction, and contributes to increase the equilibrium payroll tax. The
intuition for this result is the following: now the commitment device for sophisticated young is a higher ;
since redistribution is high, and only rich favor a positive tax, there is no need to further increase zj. The
only way to transfer resources in the second period is to increase the size of the system: the loss in utility
due to a reduced retirement age is more the compensated by the increase in the generosity of the system.
31Figure 7: Equilibrium  when  < 1=2:
It follows that, when  < 1=2, the equilibrium payroll tax mv
TI () is higher than mv
TC(): the winning
coalition is now composed by time inconsistent agents (old and young), who prefer a higher tax than time
consistent individuals.
8.3 Voting over the Bismarckian Factor
In the appendix, we show that preferences over  are single-crossing both for young and for old: hence,







V y(;; ^ j;!) (26)
where the expressions for the two indirect utility functions are given, respectively, by equations (23) and
(24). Because of A5, the problem is not same for the 2 generations: young evaluates future utility and
consumption according to the perceived discount factor ^ j2, whereas old uses the true discount factor j:
8.3.1 The Old
The following proposition summarizes our ndings about old's preferred levels of the Bismarckian factor,
+
o (;!;j) (see Figure 8 for a graphical interpretation).
32Proposition 8 Old's preferred levels of  have the following properties:
(i) It exists a productivity level !e such that +
o (;!;j) > 0 for !e  !  !+: Otherwise, +



















Proof. See Appendix B.
In part (i) we show that, for given , only old with ! > !e favor +
o > 0, while individuals with
!  !e(<  !) prefer a at pension and vote for +
o = 0. To see why poor prefer a purely Beveridgean
system, we have to consider how changes in the Bismarckian factor inuence individuals' utility: rst,
higher  increases z, as it establishes a closer link between working career and pension benets; second,
higher  reduces redistribution. For ! < !e, the second eect prevails, whereas for ! > !e agents prefer
to decrease redistribution and to make the system more Bismarckian. Moreover, as z is increasing with !,
also  is increasing with productivity.
Part (ii) shows that, for given !, the income threshold such that +
o (;!;j) is strictly positive, is
lower for exponential than for hyperbolic: time consistent individuals, who have a longer career, prefer to
have a more Bismarckian system than sophisticated with the same income level. This is quite intuitive,
as hyperbolic, who have realized that their retirement plans are not optimal, and prefer to limit the link
between pension benet and working history. An interesting corollary is that, contrary to the literature
(Casamatta et al. 2005), also individuals with productivity below the average prefer a positive : for
those with ! 2 [!e;  !], the increase in utility due to a longer career and a Bismarckian pension more than
compensate the loss due to a reduction of the at part of the transfer.
It follows that (part iii) hyperbolic old prefer a lower  than exponential with the same !; intuitively,
although their income level should make them in favor of a Bismarckian system, their time inconsistency,
that leads them to choose lower z and co, makes them in favor of a smaller link between length of the
working career and P(z).
In (iv), we show that, for productivities above !e, +
o (;!;j) is increasing with : augmenting the
payroll tax reduces zj and, therefore, only rich individuals with !  !e would like to increase the weight
attached to the Bismarckian part, as to increase both z and P(z).
8.3.2 The Young
The following proposition summarizes our ndings about +
y (;!; ^ j), young's most preferred Bismarckian
factor.
Proposition 9 For young, the most preferred level of  has the following properties:











33Figure 8: Preferred  for time consistent and hyperbolic old (left) and young (right).

















@ ^ j > 0;





Proof. See Appendix B.
Intuitions are similar to those behind Proposition 8 and are omitted.
8.4 Equilibrium Bismarckian Factor
Combining our results about +
y (;!; ^ j) and +
o (;!;j), we can determine the majority voting equilibrium
value of the Bismarckian factor (see Figure 9).
Proposition 10 The equilibrium mv
TI () satises the following conditions:
(i)If No R !
TC
e





e f(!)d! + (1 + n)Ny R !
TC
f







N(2 + n)=2, then mv
TI () = 0.
(ii) The majority voting equilibrium mv




























































o (!1;;j) = +
o (!2;;j) = +
y (!3;; ^ j) = +
y (!4;; ^ j)
(iv) If Ny;TI 6= 0 (or No;TI 6= 0), mv
TI () < opt:
Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition are intuitive: if the fraction of poor and time inconsistent is high
enough, the equilibrium pension system is purely Beveridgean. In particular, the extra support for mv
TI () =






In (iii), we compute the equilibrium level mv
TI (): as for the payroll tax, time inconsistency introduces
two eects in the political game: the overcondence eect, displayed by old, is due to the fact that
hyperbolic try to compensate the loss due to impatience by increasing the redistributive part of the pension
formula, i.e. lowering . Also the resignation eect lowers the equilibrium : sophisticated young already
know that they will not be able to stick with their optimal plans, and therefore support a more redistributive
pension compared to time consistent individuals with the same !.
In part (iv), to stress the dierences between our behavioral model and a standard model with exponential
preferences, we distinguish between mv
TI (); the Bismarckian factor emerging in the hyperbolic voting game,
and mv
TC(), the equilibrium when Ny;TI = No;TI = 0. If hyperbolic individuals are able to form a coalition
with exponential poor, the resulting pension system is more redistributive than that an ideal, exponential,
one. The reasons for this excess of redistribution are quite intuitive: hyperbolic discounting introduces
a third form of redistribution, besides from young to old and from rich to poor: from time consistent
35to hyperbolic individuals, or from individuals with long career to early retirees, a result in line with the
empirical evidence provided in Liberman (2001).
In (v) we compare opt with the equilibrium one; we nd that, while the former is increasing in NTI, the
latter is actually decreasing with it: if the number of hyperbolic individuals increases, their political power
increases too, thus making the pension system more Beveridgean. The intuition for this result is simple:
the social planner, when setting optimal , takes into account into the budget constraint that present-
biased workers will retire earlier than planned. He therefore internalizes the negative externality between
hyperbolic and exponential, and applies a corrective Pigouvian tax, in the form of a higher Bismarckian
factor. By increasing , the planner postpones workers' retirement.
8.5 Simultaneous Voting
The simultaneous equilibrium  a la Shepsle is determined by aggregating the two reaction functions, mv
TI ()
and mv
TI (). The point(s) in which they intercepts, if any, is a candidate for being the equilibrium outcome
of the simultaneous game, (s;s). Depending on the values of the parameters and the income distribution,
two equilibria are possible (see Figure 10): if the income distribution is relatively skewed to the right, the
resulting mv() is high. We refer to this equilibrium as a Bismarckian social security system. If the income
distributions skewed to the left, we have a Beveridgean pension system.
Our objective is to show how time inconsistency modies the voting equilibrium and improves the realism
of our political predictions: to do that, we compare two situations: (s
TI;s
TI), the simultaneous equilibrium
that arises in our hyperbolic model and (s
TC;s
TC), the equilibrium of an ideal, time consistent, economy.
Therefore, in each picture, we depict four curves: the voting functions resulting from our hyperbolic model,
mv
TI () and mv
TI (); and the voting functions of the ideal time-consistent economy, mv
TC() and mv
TC():





Proposition 6 we know that, when   1
2, the overcondence and the commitment eects go in opposite
directions. In Figure 10, we have depicted the most interesting case, mv
TI () < mv
TC(). If a Bismarckian




TC); we can see that time inconsistency
reduces the equilibrium value of  and increases the generosity of the social security with respect to the time
consistent economy: hyperbolic agents are decisive in the political process and they can, at the same time,
decrease  and soften the link between pension benet and working history, because it represents a way to
raise old-age consumption. On the other hand, whenever a Beveridgean system emerges, redistribution is
higher in the hyperbolic economy than in the exponential one.
Our theoretical results match the stylized facts presented in the introduction. First, we provide a
political justication for the negative relationship between generosity of the social security system and
degree of redistribution, as shown by Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2005): in our equilibrium, Bismarckian
systems are bigger than Beveridgean ones. Second, we have provided a possible explanation for the cross-
country dierences in the degree of redistribution observed in reality. In our model, four type of pension
systems may emerge: Bismarckian with high level of redistributions (Belgium, Austria, Germany), that can
36Figure 10: Simultaneous equilibrium in a Bismarckian (left) and Beveridgean system (right).
be classied as \time inconsistent", and the winning coalition of hyperbolic agents decreases the level of 
with respect to \time consistent" countries (Italy, Greece). The same happens with Beveridgean systems:
from one side, we have hyperbolic countries (UK, New Zealand, Canada and Denmark) with a very high
level of redistribution, and, on the other side, Beveridgean, time consistent, pension system with higher 
(U.S., Japan, Switzerland).
9 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied a model of social security with endogenous retirement age and hyperbolic discounting
in individuals' preferences.
Our model provides a justication for the observed growth of voluntary early retirement and the drop in
post-retirement consumption due to inadequate saving. We show that time inconsistent agents weights too
much the costs associated to postponed retirement (foregone leisure) and too less the benets (the increase
in pension benets). Early retirement and overconsumption when young are optimal from the point the
view of an hyperbolic individual. A time consistent and utilitarian planner, on the other hand, to correct
this externality, would like to provide a commitment device to hyperbolic workers, in order to force them to
retire later. The commitment device takes the form of a high Bismarckian factor, that guarantees a tighter
link between working history and benets. This instrument plays the role of a Pigouvian tax: the planner
internalize the eect of anticipated retirement on the social security budget constraint.
Our political model has shed light on three stylized facts, not yet addressed by the literature. First,
as Liberman (2001) points out, redistribution in most pension system seems not to be related to lifetime
income but to other factors: for instance, it goes from workers with longer careers to early retirees. Second,
37the classical distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridgean pension system, where the former are less
redistributive than the latter, appears to be misleading, since we observe in reality very redistributive
Bismarckian: other factors, besides income distribution, determine the ability of the system to redistribute
income. Third, it exists a negative relationship between the size and degree of redistribution in most OECD
pension systems. Bigger system (in terms of share of GDP devoted to pension transfer) are also the less
redistributive.
We show that the winning coalition determining the size and the degree of redistribution of the PAYG
system always include hyperbolic individuals. More precisely, time inconsistent individuals prefer to decrease
the size of the system, since a lower payroll tax act as a commitment device that increases both retirement
age and savings.
Morover, hyperbolic individuals prefer a more redistributive system compared to exponential. Besides
the intragenerational and intergenerational redistribution, our model adds a third form of redistribution:
from far-sighted to hyperbolic individuals. It follows that the equilibrium Bismarckian factor is always lower
than the one chosen by an utilitarian social planner.
Therefore, whenever hyperbolic individuals have enough political power, the resulting pension system is
small, i.e. low payroll tax but high redistribution.
The policy implications of our model are immediate: tightening the link between the length of the working
career and benets received, so that workers autonomously decide to retire later, can be an ineective way to
reduce government spending and the problem of early retirement. In this view, a \paternalistic" intervention,
in the form of an increase of the minimal retirement age, appear to be more appropriate instrument to solve
the pension crisis experienced by most European countries.
The next step of our research is to test empirically these predictions, and in particular to analyze
whether the level of time inconsistency eectively diers among countries. If this is the case, than it would
be relatively easier to compare if the presence of a high number of voluntary early retirees who regret the
lack of accumulated saving leads to a particular pension system whose characteristics are in line with our
predictions.
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Appendix
A Pension Programs in OECD Countries
Country Type Progressivity Index Pension Expenditure (% GDP)
Australia BE 74,8 4,7
Austria BI 20,7 10,7
Belgium BI 64,8 8,7
Canada BE 86,5 4,8
Denmark BE 91,7 8,3
France BI 46,4 10,6
Germany BI 22,9 11,7
Greece BI 4,3 12,7
Ireland BE 100 2,7
Italy BI 4 11,3
Japan BE 47,8 7,3
Netherlands BE 5,7 6,4
New Zealand BE 100 4,7
Spain BI 13 8,3
Switzerland BE 44,1 11,8
UK BE 69,6 8,1
US BE 40,6 5,3
Table V: Pension Programs in selected OECD countries (Disney 2001 and OECD 2005).
41B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Part (ii) of Lemma 1 show that ze > zs: To show the Pareto-improvement, we use the following notation.
Let Uo(zj) the utility of a \pre-retirement" old, given its retirement age zj: We want to show that:
f() = U(ze)   U(zs ()) > 0
Note that U(zs ()) depends on  in two ways:  is the discount factor, so changes in  aect future
consumption (when retired). Moreover,  enters into the expression that determines zs itself. On the other
hand, note that  only inuences U(ze) through the rst mechanism, as ze does not depend on : In the
proof, we characterize the value of f(:) in a neighborhood of  = 1: First, note that f(1) = 0; since ze = zs:









































such that f() > 0 for  2
  ;1

: This shows that a sophisticated worker is made better
o by increasing its retirement age to ze. Pareto dominance follows from the fact that all selves (pre and
post-retirement) are made better o in two ways: rst, they prefer ze that inuences pre and post retirement
consumption and, second, they prefer gaining more pension benets as implied by ze:
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
This proof parallels the proof of Proposition 1 and is omitted.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2
From (17), the rst derivative is:
@P(b zj)(:)
@






A necessary and sucient condition for this expression to be positive is the following:
22!2(1   ^ j)  !2 + (1 + n)(   ^ j )(! + (1   ) !)
and the denition of ^  follows immediately. Dierentiating again P(b zj) with respect to  gives us:
@2P(b zj)(:)
@2 =  
2(1   ^ j)
   ^ j 
< 0 (B-27)
42B.4 Proof of Proposition 3






















+ s =0 (B-29)
where s and  are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the non-negativity constraints on s and .
Depending on which constraints bind, we have dierent cases. Before doing that, we check whether the
objective function V y(
y
j ;; ^ j;!) is concave in (
y
j ; b sj), so that the solutions represent indeed global optima.
The Hessian matrix is:
D2V y(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The determinant of the Hessian is:
det(D2V y(
y







































The sign of the determinant depends on that of the last term on the RHS of (B-33): by replacing (B-27)
and (7) into (33), we nd that a sucient condition for (B-33) to be positive is ^   1
, which is always
satised. Since (B-30) and (B-31) are always negative, the Hessian matrix is negative denite and the
objective function is concave in (
y
j ; b sj)
Case 1: s =  = 0
None of the constraints is binding: replacing (B-29) into (B-28), we get:
+
y (!;; ^ j) =
(   ^ j )[!   (1 + n)(! + (1   ) !] + !(1   )(!   ^ j )
2!2(1   ^ j)(1   2)
(B-34)
43The sign of this expression depends on the sign of the term (1   2). Since both cases are plausible, we
discuss them separately. Suppose, rst, that is negative ( > 1=2): a necessary and sucient condition for
this tax rate to be positive (part (i) of the proposition) is:
(   ^ j )[!   (1 + n)(! + (1   ) !] + !(1   )(!   ^ j ) < 0










(1 + n)  
   ^ j (1 + (1   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The solution has the form !1  !  ~ !, where the threshold ~ ! is given by ~ ! =  b+
p
b2 4ac
2a ; given that
only the second root is positive, preferred tax rates are positive for !   !  ~ !. To prove last part of (i),
dierentiate +
y (!;; ^ j) with respect to ! :
@+
y (!;; ^ j)
@!
=
(   ^ j )(1   (1 + n)) + (1   )(2!   ^ j )
2!2(1   ^ j)(1   2)
 
2[numerator of (B-34)]
2!3(1   ^ j)(1   2)
This expression is equivalent to:
@+
y (!;; ^ j)
@!
=
(   ^ j )
(1   ^ j)(1   2)
"




^ j (1   )
   ^ j 
#
(B-36)
The rst term is negative, since 2 > 1, and a sucient condition for the second term to be positive is:
(1 + n) +
^ j (1   )
   ^ j 
> 1 (B-37)




@! < 0; for !  < ! < ~ !.
The impact of hyperbolic discounting on preferred tax rates (part ii) is given by:
@+
y (!;; ^ j)
@^ j
=
(  )(!   (1 + n)[! + (1   ) !])    !(1   )
2!2(1   ^ j)(1   2)
+
[numerator of (B-34)](1   2)!22
h
2!2(1   ^ j)(1   2)
i2
After some rearrangements, we get:
@+
y (!;; ^ j)
@^ j
=
(    )










+ (1   )(!    )
i
(B-38)
The sign of (B-38) depends on the sign of the term into square brackets, that is given by the following
second degree inequality:
(1   )!2   (1   (1 + n)   (1   ))
| {z }
b




44This expression denes a threshold !b =  b
p
b2 4ac
2a (the second root is negative, since c < 0). It can be
easily shown that !b < ~ !; and thus @
j




@ ^ j < 0 for !   ! <  !.
Part (iii) of the proposition is obtained by dierentiating ~ ! with respect to ^ .
@~ !
@^ j
=   (1 + n) + ((1   ) + 1) +
1
k




((1   ) + 1) ^ j    
i




 of expression (B   35) > 0. After some rearrangements, we obtain that the sign of @~ !
@ ^ j is
equivalent to the sign of:
^ j  [(1 + n) + ((1   ) + 1)]
2    [(1 + n) + 1]
2  
[(1   )[(1 + n) + 1)]]   2(1   ) !(1 + n)(1   )
The last two terms of this expression are negative: therefore, a sucient condition for the whole expression
to be negative is:
^ j  [(1 + n) + ((1   ) + 1)]




^ j ((1 + n) + 1 + (1   ))  
p




^ j ((1 + n) + ((1   ) + 1)) +
p
 [(1 + n) + 1]

 0
Notice that the rst term is always negative, since
q
^ j  <
p
 and (1   ) < 1: Therefore, @~ !
@ ^  < 0.
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@! < 0 for !~ !. For the second term, we can nd two sucient
conditions for this expression to be negative. We will see that this conditions are always satised, and then
we conclude that
@ b sj(!)
@! > 0. These two conditions are:
1.
b zj   +
y (!;; ^ j)(b zj(1   )   (1 + n)) < 0
2.
!b zj(1   ) + (1 + n)((1   ) ! + !) < 0
45The rst condition can be rewritten as:
 >
1
(1   )   1




b zj( + 1 + n)
Which is always satised, given that  2 [0;1].
Replacing the expression for optimal retirement age (6), condition 2 can be rewritten as:
!2(1   )(1   (1   )

  (1 + n)!   (1 + n)(1   ) ! < 0 () 0  !   !
It can be easily checked that this threshold  ! is always greater than ~ !. Hence,
@ b sj(!)
@! > 0;8!  ~ !. Moreover,
from (B-29), we can see that the function b sj(!) is negative when !  is low and positive when ! approaches
to ~ !: Thus, there exists a value !0 < ~ ! such that saving are zero for !  !0 and positive above. Therefore,
all workers with income between !0 and ^ ! have an interior solution for both  and b sj:
Part (v) of the proposition comes from noticing that, with +
y (!;; ^ j) = 1;8j; (B-28) becomes:
 !u0(0) + ^ ju0(cj
o)









By Inada conditions, lim
x!0
u0(x) = +1.
In part (vi), we show that preferred tax rates are concave in . To see that, notice that, for !   !  ~ !,
preferred tax rates +












y (!;; ^ j);;!; ^ j

@2 < 0 (B-43)
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The rst term is zero because of (B-28) (remember that we restrict consumption levels to be strictly positive).












(1 + n)(!    !) +
!
   ^ j 

!   ^ j  + !B
#
where B = (4^ j   2   ^ j): For the whole second term to be positive, it suces that jBj < 1, which
is always true. Finally, the sign of the entire expression depends crucially on the individual's income: if









46Case 2: s > 0;  = 0
Individuals with !  !0 choose a positive tax rate +
y (!;; ^ j) (given by B-28) and no saving.
Case 3: s = 0;  > 0
Individuals with productivity above ~ ! rely exclusively on private saving, that are dened by (B-29).
To determine the majority voting solution, we have to know how preferred tax rates +
y (!;; ^ j) vary
with income for individuals below !0 (those with b sj = 0): From (B-28):
@+








































b zj(1   +
y ) + +









y is the second order derivative of V y(+
y ; b sj) with respect to +
y , that is negative:
@2V y(+

















































































o) ; and after some rearrangements, we
obtain:




















































where the second term on the RHS is negative, as one can check by replacing expressions (7) and (B-27).
Finally, after some rearrangements, expression (B-44) can be rewritten as:
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b zj(1   +
y ) + 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where  is the coecient of relative risk aversion, that is assumed to be lower than 1 (as in Casamatta,





y @!  0;
and that the second term in square bracket is positive for !  !0. Thus, for individuals with income !  !0;
who do not save privately, tax rates are decreasing with income.
47B.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Case 1: s =  = 0
We consider now the case  < 1=2: +
y (!;; ^ j) is positive only for ~ !  !  !+ (part i). For part (ii),
let us consider the expression (B-36). Now, the second term of the right hand side is positive and the rst





For (iii), we have that :
@+
y (!;; ^ j)
@^ j
=
(    )










+ (1   )(!    )
i
(B-47)
The sign of the whole derivative depends on the sign of the term in square brackets. We have already shown
(see Proposition 3) that it is positive for income levels above !b(< ~ !): It follows that for any ! such that
+




@ ^ j < 0.
























b zj   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y) + ^ ju00(c
j
o)
The rst term is negative and the second is positive: we are not able to give a clear sign to this expression:
therefore, we assume that is positive. From (B-29) we can see that the function b sj(!) is negative when ! 
is low and positive when ! approaches to ~ !: Thus, there exists a value !0 such that saving are zero for
!  !0 and positive above.
Parts (iv) and (v) follow from proposition 3. Part (vi) can be proved in the same way as in proposition
3.
Case 2: s > 0;  > 0
Individuals with !  !0 prefer +
y (!;; ^ j) = 0 and do not save.
Case 3: s = 0;  > 0
Rich individuals with income !0  !  ~ ! rely exclusively on private saving, whose expression is implicitly
dened by (B-29).
B.6 Proof of Proposition 5
























48From (B-30), the rst term in square brackets at the RHS is negative and the objective function is concave.













!   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   j 

(1   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) + j(1 + n)[! + (1   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
(B-49)
At  = 0, everyone works in the second period. This expression is greater than 0 only for !   !  _ !;
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o (!;;j) is positive only for individuals with income below
the threshold.




























 < 0 is the second derivative of the objective function. Given our assumptions on u(:) and since
we focus only on the case !  _ !; the second term on the numerator is negative. For the rst one, observe
that:
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The solution takes the form 0  !   ! =  b+
p
b2 4ac
2a : It can be shown that  !  _ !; thus, preferred tax rates
are decreasing with income for  !  !  _ !: Unfortunately, we can not give clear predictions for productivity
levels !   !   ! : however, since +
o (! ;;j) > 0 (see part (i) of the proposition), we are able to




!(!   ^ j )(1   ^ j)   ^ j(   ^ j )(1 + n)(! + (1   ) !)
!22(1   ^ j)
(B-52)
It is easy to verify that +
o (! ;;j) < +
o ( !;;j); therefore, for !   !   !, optimal tax rates for old
are increasing with income.
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2
This sign of this derivative depends crucially on the term 1 2: for   1=2; the whole term is negative,
and thus @ _ !
@j < 0. For   1=2, rearranging the expression above, we get:
 (1 + n) !(1   )
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Since we assume  being not too high, i.e.
 







 () (j   1)
2 > 0; which is always true. Therefore, also for   1=2; @ _ !
@j < 0.
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j  0 for !   !  !c and




@j > 0 otherwise.
Finally, part (v) can be shown in the same way as Propositions 3 and 4: for individuals with !   !  _ !;
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where B = j(1 + 3j)   1   j   2




@ ) is positive for





B.7 Proof that +
o ( !;;j) and +
y (! ;; ^ j)) are not comparable
When  > 1=2; the maximal tax rate for old is given by (B-52), while the maximal rate for young is (B-34).
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The rst term is positive, but the second is negative: a deeper analysis does not provide any interesting
conditions for the whole expression to have a clear sign.
B.8 Proof that Preferences over  are Single Crossing
Single crossing requires that, for i
j i = y;o xed, !1 < !2 and 1 < 2 :
V y(;2; ^ j;!1) > V y(;1; ^ j;!1) =) V y(;2; ^ j;!2) > V y(;1; ^ j;!2)
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that V y(;2; ^ j;!1) > V y(;1; ^ j;!1); it follows that:
[b zj(2;!1)   b zj(1;!1)][!1(1   )   ( +  )(b zj(2;!1) + b zj(1;!1))    ]+
+!1 [(1 + n)(2   1)] + [2 b zj(2;!1)   1 b zj(1;!1)] >  !(1 + n)(2   1)
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j )2
!1
51where A = (1 + n)(   ^ j )2   ^ j (    )(1 + 2^ j) is a constant term that does not depend on !.
Given our initial assumption !1 < !2, we have:
!2K > !1K >
 !(1 + n)(   ^ j )2
!1
>
 !(1 + n)(   ^ j )2
!2
which is what we want to show.
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!(1 + n + zj) + !
@zj
@










+ ![(1 + n)(   j )   j ]
| {z }
b
   !(1 + n)(   j )
| {z }
c
We get a second degree polynomial, whose roots are given by !e0;e =  b
p
b2+4ac
2a . Therefore, +
o (;!;j) >
0 for income levels !e  !  !+, whereas, for productivity !   !  !f, +




((1+n)( j ) j )2+4(1 ) !(1+n)( j )
2(1 ) :













4(1   ) !(1 + n) 
p
X
where X = ((1 + n)(   j )   j )2 + 4(1   ) !(1 + n)(   j ): Notice that:
((1+n)( j ) j )
2




















































 < 0 and the numerator is always positive.
























@@ : Following our previous discussion, we have that for
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!(1 + n + ^ zj) + !
@^ zj
@





After some rearrangements, we have that young vote have a preferred positive  if and only if:
!2(1   )















   ^ j 








  !(1 + n)






We get a second degree polynomial, whose roots are given by !f0;f =  b
p
b2+4ac
2a : Being the rst root
negative, +
o (;!;j) > 0 only for !f  !  !+. To prove parts (ii) and (iii), we proceed as in Proposition
8.
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